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political	 and	media	 discourse	 stressing	 welfare	 dependency	 and	 deception,	 has	 buttressed	
support	for	social	security	reform	in	recent	years	(see	also:	Jensen	and	Tyler,	2015).	Careful	
analyses	 of	 British	 Social	 Attitudes	 Survey	 data	 from	 the	 mid-1980s	 onwards	 has	 often	











Quantitative	 analyses	 of	 public	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 both	 longitudinal	
national	 and	 cross-sectional	 cross-national	 studies	 –	 have	 typically	 observed	 that	 public	
opinion	 is	 influenced	 by	 ‘the	 immediate	 surrounding	 socio-economic	 conditions’	 (Gelissen,	
2008:	247).	For	instance,	how	deserving	the	unemployed	are	viewed	to	be	has	been	shown	to	
be	affected	by	the	unemployment	rate	(van	Oorschot,	2006).	Curtice	(2010)	suggests	attitudes	
often	 reflect	 a	 ‘thermostatic’	pattern,	 support	 for	 additional	 public	 spending	 falling	 after	 a	
period	 in	 which	 public	 expenditure	 has	 risen	 and	 vice-versa.	 However,	 despite	
implementation	 of	 a	 significant	 austerity	 agenda	 since	 2010	 and	 sustained	 economic	
problems	 since	 the	 Global	 Financial	 Crisis,	 British	 Social	 Attitudes	 (BSA)	 survey	 data	 show	
few	 signs	 of	 a	 resurgence	 of	 support	 for	 the	welfare	 state	 in	 the	UK.	 Consequently,	 Taylor-
Gooby	and	Taylor	(2015:	77)	suggest	‘The	‘thermostat	effect’	appears	to	have	been	weaker	in	




in	 support	 for	 spending	on	public	 services	 in	general	 and	on	welfare	 in	particular’	 (Taylor-
Gooby	and	Taylor,	2015:	93).	
Many	have	argued	 that	 this	a	 consequence	of	new	vocabularies	of	disapprobation	 targeting	
benefit	recipients	dominating	political	and	popular	discussion:	the	Coalition	and	subsequent	
Conservative	 governments	 have	 invoked	 discourses	 that	 emphasise	 individual	 behaviours,	
linking	 the	welfare	 state	 to	dependency	 (Bambra	and	Smith,	 2010;	Wiggan,	2012;	Pantazis,	
2016);	the	media	has	echoed	shouts	of	‘cheats’,	‘undeserving’	and	‘scroungers’	(McEnhill	and	
Byrne,	2014;	Hughes,	2015),	with	such	stereotypes	appropriated	for	wider	political	projects.	
Jensen	(2014),	 for	example,	suggests	that	a	 ‘new	welfare	commonsense’,	 fuelled	by	negative	




into	popular	debates	 (Garthwaite,	 2011).	 Such	discourses	of	poverty,	 it	 is	 often	argued,	 are	
reminiscent	 of	 nineteenth	 century	 understandings	 which	 gained	 new	 life	 in	 the	 twentieth	
century,	particularly	during	the	Thatcher	period	as	the	UK	embraced	a	growing	individualism	
(Pantazis,	2016:	9-10).	The	deserving	are	those	who	search	for	opportunities,	embracing	the	
precarious	 and	 insecure	 nature	 of	 the	 jobs	market,	 eschewing	 social	 security	 benefits.	 The	





imaginary’	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 widely	 shared	 understandings	 and	 expectations	 around	
welfare	 state	provision	which	 is	underpinned	by	political	discourse	and	 social	 commitment	
(cf.	Taylor,	2004).	
Second,	this	hardening	includes	a	growing	prevalence	of	‘Othering’	(Pantazis,	2016;	see	also,	
Lister,	 2004	 and	 Garthwaite,	 2011)	 whereby	 ‘us	 and	 them’,	 ‘deserving	 and	 undeserving’,	
‘taxpayer	 and	 beneficiary	 are	 sketched	 as	 moral	 binaries	 on	 the	 overarching	 blueprint	 of	
policy	reform.		Alongside	an	awareness	that	the	welfare	state	did	construct	citizenship	as	both	
inclusionary	and	exclusionary	(Turner,	2001:	192)	and	was	a	‘moral	and	disciplinary	project’	
(Jensen	and	Tyler,	 2015:2)	 that	 included	 classificatory	distinctions	between	 ‘deserving’	 and	
‘undeserving’,	a	powerful	shift	is	discerned	as	being	now	underway.		Its	roots	lie	in	the	1970s	
economic	downturn	when	achieving	the	status	of	‘deserving	of	support’	became	more	difficult	
for	 the	 needy	 (Oorschot,	 2000:	 34),	 and	 which	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 growing	 scroungerphobia	 in	
popular	culture	(Golding	and	Middleton,	1982;	Garthwaite,	2011).			
Third,	 hand-in-hand	 with	 a	 hardening	 of	 attitudes	 is	 the	 broadening	 of	 this	 moral	 and	
disciplinary	 gaze	 to	 include	 groups,	 such	 as	 disabled	 people,	 that	 until	 recently	 were	 not	
subject	 to	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 stigma	 as	 other	 types	 of	 benefit	 recipients.	 	 The	 deserving	
versus	 undeserving	 distinction	 rests	 on	 three	 dimensions	 of	 disability	 (defined	 as	whether	
disadvantage	is	seen	as	within	individual	control),	proximity	(the	boundaries	of	responsibility	
and	 distinctions	 of	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’)	 and	 docility	 (whether	 recipients	 are	 compliant	 and	
grateful)	 (de	Swann,	1998),	with	 each	of	 these	 essentially	 contested,	 subject	 to	 redefinition	
and	 thus	 political	 projects.	 	 Empirical	 work	 points	 towards	 ‘control’	 as	most	 significant	 in	
explaining	deservingness	–	‘whether	people	in	need	can	be	blamed	or	can	be	held	responsible	




Fourth,	 literature	 has	 examined	 the	 impact	 of	 pejorative	 welfare	 discourses	 on	 the	 self-
identity	 and	attitudes	of	disadvantaged	groups.	 Shildrick	 and	MacDonald	 (2013)	undertook	










Whilst	 there	 seems	 relatively	 little	 doubt	 that	 the	 views	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 the	 UK	 have	




Attitudes	 survey	 –	dates	back	only	 as	 far	 as	 the	 early	1980s.	This,	 in	 turn,	means	 the	most	
commonly	 held	 positions	 about	 the	 evolution	 of	 attitudes	 to	 welfare	 are	 rooted	 in	
interpretations	 of	 this	 data	 and	 so	 rely	 on	 (theoretically	 rooted)	 presumptions	 about	 the	
direction	of	travel	in	the	period	before	this.		
To	explore	how	public	attitudes	have	evolved	over	time	we	drew	upon:	
• Opinion	 poll	 data	 from	 1940s-1980s,	 using	 data	 archived/microfiche	 based	
copies	of	original	polling	reports	indexed	by	Tyler’s	(1990)	British	Opinion	Polls,	
1960-1988,	Gallup’s	 (1976)	 The	 Gallup	 international	 public	 opinion	 polls:	 Great	
Britain	1937-1975	and	wartime	British	Institute	of	Public	Opinion	polls	stored	in	
the	UK	Data	Archive	(Hinton	et	al,	1996)	




• One-off	 surveys	 of	 attitudes	 to	 welfare	 (or	 wider	 surveys	 with	 a	 welfare	




















It	 is	now	almost	something	of	an	orthodoxy	 to	suggest	 that	public	attitudes	have	hardened.	
Indeed,	 the	House	of	Commons	Work	and	Pensions	Select	Committee	recently	announced	 it	
would	 review	 the	 principles	 of	 social	 security,	 in	 part	 because	 ‘over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time,	
voters	 have	 been	 withdrawing	 support	 for	 Britain's	 welfare	 state	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	
believe	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 fair’	 (Work	 and	 Pensions	 Select	 Committee,	 2015).	 Such	 views	 are	










data.	But	while	 the	BSA	data	 is	 the	best	we	have,	 the	 first	BSA	surveys	–	undertaken	 in	 the	
early-to-mid-1980s	 -	 do	 not	 represent	 the	 start	 of	 the	 story	 on	 changing	 attitudes	 to	 the	
welfare	 state.	 This	 is,	 at	 best,	 an	 arbitrary	 moment	 to	 begin	 the	 story,	 but	 it	 could	 be	 a	





spending	 cuts,	 potentially	 adding	 considerable	 ‘noise’	 to	 attitudes	 data	 during	 this	 period.		
Our	analysis	of	pre-BSA	data	suggests	a	 ‘bounce	thesis’	 (see	also	Hudson,	Lunt	et	al.,	2016):	
that	 there	may	well	have	been	a	clear	upturn	 in	support	 for	 the	welfare	state	 in	 the	1980s,	
meaning	the	BSA	data	should	not	be	read	as	capturing	the	latest	stage	in	a	many	decades	long	





of	 support	 for	 this	 bounce	 thesis.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 beginning	 with	 those	 asking	 the	 most	
similar	questions,	three	key	surveys	conducted	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	showed	high	levels	of	
support	 for	additional	 spending2.	 Probably	 the	 first	detailed	 social	 scientific	 study	of	public	
attitudes	towards	the	post-war	welfare	state	was	that	carried	out	by	PEP	in	1957	and	1958	
(PEP	1961)	 and	 it	 found	 some	66%	 felt	more	 should	be	 spent	 on	 ‘social	 services’.	 	 A	more	
comprehensive	study	conducted	a	decade	later	by	New	Society	(see	Nevitt,	1967;	Wedderburn,	
1967a;	Forsyth,	1967;	Donnison,	1967;	Wiseman,	1967)	asked	a	broadly	similar	question	and	
found	 56%	 supportive	 of	 the	 view	 that	 more	 should	 be	 spent	 on	 some	 social	 services.	
Variations	 in	survey	design	and	questions	mean	the	results	are	not	strictly	comparable,	and	
neither	asked	respondents	whether	 they	would	maintain	support	should	 taxes	need	 to	rise,	
but	overall	the	surveys	showed	high	levels	of	support,	similar	to	those	the	BSA	highlighted	in	
the	 1980s.	 A	 third	 survey	 that	 was	 conducted	 in	 1960	 (Abrams	 and	 Rose	 (1960)	 asked	
respondents	if	they	were	willing	to	pay	more	taxes	for	‘social	benefits’	and	again	found	high,	




University	 Centre	 for	Mass	 Communication	 (LUCMC)	 in	 1977,	 albeit	with	 a	modest	 sample	
size,	found	that	47%	felt	too	much	was	spent	on	welfare	and	social	security	and	just	21%	felt	
too	little	was	(Golding	and	Middleton	1982:	182	f/n5).	The	LUCMC	study	suggests	a	hardening	
of	 opinion	 by	 this	 point,	 though	 limits	 to	 the	 design	 of	 this	 survey	 give	 us	 reason	 to	 be	
cautious.	 However,	 other	 surveys	 provide	 additional	 support	 for	 the	 view	 that	 support	
appeared	 to	 harden	 during	 the	 late-1960s	 and	 1970s.	 Butler	 and	 Stokes	 (1974)	 report	 the	
findings	from	representative	surveys	of	the	electorate	conducted	during	this	period	for	their	
Political	Change	in	Britain	 study.	While,	 in	 1964,	 77%	 said	 they	 felt	 the	 government	 should	
spend	more	on	pensions	and	social	services,	only	around	55%	did	in	1966	and	1970	(and	just	
43%	 in	 1969,	 though	 additional	 survey	 response	 options	 in	 the	 1969	&	 1970	 surveys	 add	
some	noise	 to	 the	 findings).	Butler	 and	Stokes	 followed	 this	 study	with	 the	British	Election	
Study	 from	1974	and	though	questions	differ	a	good	deal	 from	those	above,	examination	of	










The	 second	 issue	 we	 identify	 above	 relates	 to	 processes	 of	 othering,	 particularly	 the	
‘deserving’/’undeserving’	 distinction.	 One	 of	 the	 problems	 faced	 in	 assessing	 whether	
attitudes	 to	 ‘welfare’	have	 ‘hardened’	 is	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	Baumberg	 (2014b)	argues,	 ‘Benefit	
attitudes	are	not	simply	“hard”	or	“soft”	but	complex	and	uneven’.	A	common	argument,	again	
supported	by	much	of	 the	BSA	data,	 is	 that	 the	hardening	of	attitudes	has	been	particularly	
evident	with	respect	 to	benefits	 for	out-of-work	working	age	people.	 	Deeming	(2015:	867)	
argues	 the	BSA	data	 show	 that	 a	 ‘at	 the	 start	 of	 the	21st	 century,	 a	 distinct	 attitudinal	 shift	
begins	to	emerge’,	pointing	to	data	showing	that	relatively	few	see	benefits	as	inadequate	and	
that	 some	 62%	 believe	 that	 ‘out-of-work	 benefits	 are	 too	 generous	 and	 promote	 the	
dependency	culture’	as	especially	key.		




from	 the	 Victorian	 period	 onwards	 (Chase	 and	 Walker,	 2012)	 ‘demonstrates	 how	 these	
assertions	have	infiltrated	cultural	values	and	norms	over	time	and	become	inculcated	in	the	
public	 psyche’	 (Walker	 and	 Chase,	 2013:	 134).	 Disentangling	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	
contemporary	discourses	 is	a	challenging	 task	 to	say	 the	 least,	particularly	when	examining	
historical	 survey	 data	 that	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 nuance	 of	 historically	 specific	 contexts.	




1967	New	Society	 study	 uncovered	 a	 good	 degree	 of	 skepticism	 about	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
Supplementary	Benefit/National	Assistance	safety	net,	with	a	large	majority	(73%)	agreeing	
there	 were	 ‘many	 people	 drawing	 supplementary	 benefit/national	 assistance	 who	 could	
really	 be	 earning	 enough	 to	 support	 themselves	 if	 they	 wanted	 to’,	 but	 a	 similarly	 large	
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majority	 (71%)	 agreeing	 ‘there	 are	 many	 people	 who	 need	 to	 draw	 supplementary	
benefit/national	 assistance	 but	 who	 are	 not	 doing	 so’	 (Wedderburn	 1967a).	 In	 the	 same	
survey,	 amongst	 people	 who	 felt	 too	 much	 was	 being	 spent	 on	 a	 social	 service,	 ‘National	
Assistance	is	too	easy’	was	the	most	commonly	cited	(17%	of	this	group)	reason	(Wiseman,	
1967).	Widespread	concerns	about	the	 impact	of	 the	welfare	state	on	work	 incentives	were	
suggested	by	an	ORC	poll	 conducted	 for	 the	Conservative	Party	 in	1968	where	89%	agreed	
‘Too	many	people	don’t	bother	to	work	because	they	can	live	well	enough	on	the	dole’,	78%	
agreed	 ‘We	have	so	many	Social	Services	 that	people	work	 less	hard	than	they	used	to’	and	
87%	agreed	‘Too	many	take	advantage	of	benefits	by	taking	time	off	work’	(Klein,	1974).	The	





in	 the	 ‘shift	 from	 welfare	 imaginaries	 of	 the	 1940s	 to	 the	 anti-welfare	 consensus	 of	 the	
political	 present	 tense	 (Jensen	 and	 Tyler,	 2015:	 485).	 Historical	 survey	 data	 suggest	 there	
may	be	a	greater	continuity	between	these	periods	than	commonly	presumed	in	this	regard	







views	 only	 of	 households	with	 children	 (PEP,	 1961).	 Indeed,	 polls	 and	 surveys	 across	 this	
period	consistently	pointed	to	a	hierarchy	of	support	with	provisions	targeted	at	the	poorest	
or	 at	 families	with	 children	 the	 least	 popular	 and	 pensions	 usually	 the	most	 popular;	with	
remarkable	 consistency	over	 the	years,	 there	 is	 a	very	 large	majority	which	 favours	 raising	
pensions	 and	 a	 very	 large	minority	which	 is	 highly	 critical	 of	 family	 allowances	 (see	Klein,	







here,	but	 it	 is	quite	 likely	 that	 it	was	 the	old	who	were	being	considered	 in	need.	What	 the	
replies	do	suggest,	however,	is	that	the	concept	of	the	“deserving’’	and	‘’undeserving”	poor	is	
still	very	much	alive’.	Other	surveys	around	this	time	provide	support	for	Wedderburn’s	view.	
For	 instance,	a	1968	survey	conducted	by	Market	 Investigations	Limited	 for	 the	 then	newly	
established	Department	for	Health	and	Social	Security	(DHSS)	found	‘old	people	living	alone’	














aspects	 of	 the	Welfare	 State	 and	 a	 suspicion	 amongst	many	 that	 some	 services	were	 being	
abused	 and	 particular	 groups	 were	 marked	 out	 for	 public	 disapproval.	 Earlier	 reviews	 of	
attitudes	to	welfare	made	similar	observations.	Reflecting	on	public	attitudes	data	(including	
their	 own)	 from	 the	 post-war	 period	 up	 to	 the	 very	 early	 1980s,	 Golding	 and	 Middleton	
(1982:	229)	concluded	‘the	so-called	‘welfare	consensus’	has	never	taken	deep	root,	and	was	








include	 groups,	 such	 as	 disabled	 people,	 that	 until	 recently	 were	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 same	
amount	of	stigma	as	other	groups	of	benefit	recipients.	Approaching	the	issue	from	a	cultural	
political	 economy	 perspective,	 Jensen	 and	 Tyler	 (2015:	 484)	 argue	 that	 ‘The	 hardening	 of	
public	attitudes	towards	working-age	benefits	claimants	in	particular,	such	as	families	living	
with	 poverty	 and	 disabled	 people,	marks	 a	 significant	 shift	 in	 public	 attitudes	 towards	 the	
welfare	state’.		
Surveys	 from	 the	1960s	 and	1970s	 clearly	 placed	disabled	people	 in	 the	 ‘deserving’	 group.	
The	 1968	 survey	 conducted	 by	 Market	 Investigations	 Limited	 for	 the	 DHSS	 (PRO	 1967,	
T227/3094)	 	 found	 65%	 of	 respondents	 willing	 to	 pay	 more	 tax	 in	 order	 to	 help	 specific	
‘vulnerable	 groups’	 and,	 of	 this	 group,	 65%	would	do	 so	 for	 ‘mentally	 handicapped	people’	
and	64%	for	‘People	who	are	seriously	handicapped	by	physical	disabled	or	illness’,	exceeded	
only	by	 the	76%	willing	 to	pay	more	 to	 support	 ‘old	people	 living	alone’.	By	 contrast	 there	




18)	 reports	 findings	 from,	 found	 people	 who	 were	 ‘very	 old’,	 ‘physically	 handicapped’,	
‘epileptics’,	 ‘homeless’	or	‘mentally	handicapped’	elicited	most	support,	while	unsympathetic	






more	 government	 spending	 on	 benefits	 for	 disabled	 people	who	 cannot	work	 (down	 from	
72%	 in	1998),	 and	only	3%	of	 respondents	would	 like	 to	 see	 less	government	 spending	on	
benefits	 for	disabled	people	who	cannot	work	(Clery,	2016).	 	These	figures	perhaps	suggest	
not.	 However,	 survey	 responses	 alone	 cannot	 accurately	 capture	 how	 attitudes	 may	 have	
evolved.	The	mechanisms	whereby	sickness,	illness	and	disability	are	re-defined	and	crafted,	
involving	policy-makers	and	media,	is	a	key	insight	that	we	can	draw	from	Jensen	and	Tyler’s	
work	 (2015).	 	 Thus	 whilst	 there	 is	 continued	 strong	 support	 for	 those	 who	 are	 seen	 as	
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the	 same	way	 to	questions	probing	pejorative	 attitudes:	78%	of	benefit	 recipients	 (cf.	 81%	
non-recipients)	agreed	 ‘Nowadays	 too	many	people	depend	on	welfare’;	71%	(compared	 to	
70%)	 agreed	 ‘There's	 so	much	welfare	 now	 it's	made	 the	people	 of	 this	 country	 lazy;	 39%	
(compared	with	41%)	agreed	 ‘If	 there	wasn't	so	much	social	security	people	would	learn	to	
stand	on	their	own	two	feet’.	The	views	of	the	two	groups	clearly	differed	only	with	respect	to	
questions	 about	 the	 process	 of	 claiming	 or	 the	 adequacy	 of	 benefits,	 recipients	 much	 less	





simultaneously	defending	 their	 own	entitlement’	 (Patrick,	 2016b:	pTBC).	While	 the	historic	
quantitative	 survey	 data	 in	 Golding	 and	 Middleton’s	 survey	 cannot	 match	 the	 richness	 of	
Patrick’s	 data,	 that	 the	 views	 of	 welfare	 benefit	 recipients	 largely	 matched	 the	 rather	
pejorative	 views	 on	 non-recipients	 for	 all	 questions	 bar	 those	 directly	 related	 to	 the	
experience	of	claiming	at	least	hints	that	similar	processes	of	‘othering’	by	the	‘othered’	were	
evident	in	the	1970s	too.	In	their	own	analysis	of	their	data	Golding	and	Middleton	suggested	
that	 economic	 insecurity	 combined	 with	 sometimes	 stigmatising	 experiences	 of	 welfare	
created	 a	 situation	 where	 many	 of	 those	 with	 the	 lowest	 incomes	 found	 ‘their	 fears	 and	
resentments	readily	channelled	into	a	bitter	and	divisive	contempt	for	those	alongside	them	
at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 economic	 ladder’	 (Golding	 and	 Middleton,	 1982:	 181).	 Indeed,	 with	
further	echoes	of	Patrick’s	 (2016b:	pTBC)	work,	 in	which	 ‘Immigrants	 came	 in	 for	 frequent	
censure,	 and	 there	 was	 often	 significant	 anger	 about	 what	 was	 seen	 as	 the	 government’s	
continued	 support	 for	 immigrants,	 which	 was	 sometimes	 explicitly	 contrasted	 with	 their	
apparent	 lack	 of	 support	 for	 British	 out-of-work	 benefit	 claimants’,	 Golding	 and	Middleton	
(1982:	166)	similarly	argued	that	their	1977	survey	showed	that	attitudes	sharpened	further	
when	 ‘mingled	with	 racism	 and	 xenophobia’.	 As	 one	 of	 their	 respondents	 said,	 some	 forty	
years	ago	but	with	remarkable	similarities	to	contemporary	debates,	‘’This	welfare	spending’s	
all	wasted.	 They	 give	 these	 handouts	 to	 natural	 scroungers,	 especially	 foreigners’’	 [Age	 24,	
male	decorator]’	(Golding	and	Middleton,	1982:	166).	
Though	one-step	removed	from	the	focus	on	social	security	recipients,	Golding	and	Middleton	
(1982:	170)	noted	 too	 that	 ‘The	 low	paid	more	 than	any	other	 income	group	were	 likely	 to	
think	 that	 many	 claimants	 do	 not	 deserve	 any	 help’.	 This	 echoed	 some	 earlier	 surveys.	
Wedderburn	 (1967a:	 514)	 for	 example	 reported	 that	 one-third	 of	 the	New	Society	 sample	
thought	 too	 much	 money	 was	 being	 spent	 on	 some	 social	 services	 with	 the	 largest	 item	
mentioned	 (by	11%	of	 the	 total	 sample)	being	 family	 allowance,	 but	manual	workers	were	
more	 likely	 to	 criticize	 family	 allowance	 than	 were	 non-manual	 workers	 (1967:	 514).		











the	 basis	 of	 similarities	 in	 debates	 occurring	 across	 generations,	 ignoring	 the	 changed	
meanings	 of	 key	 terms	 or	 key	 arguments	 advanced	 at	 different	 moments	 with	 different	
contexts.	This	 issue	 is	particularly	 acute	when	exploring	 ‘deserving’	 and	 ‘undeserving’	poor	
debates	 that	 have	 a	 provenance	 stretching	back	many	 centuries	 (Walker	 and	Chase,	 2013).	
This	is	a	challenge	we	face	here	in	trying	to	examine	the	meaning	of	20th	century	data	from	the	
perspective	 of	 the	 21st	 century;	 but	 it	 was	 also	 a	 challenge	 faced	 by	 analysts	 of	 the	 20th	
century	data	too.	Indeed,	when	Wedderburn	(1967a)	suggested	the	New	Society	survey	data	
showed	 that	 notions	 of	 ‘deserving’	 and	 ‘undeserving’	 poor	 were	 very	much	 alive,	 she	 was	
rebuked	by	TH	Marshall	 (1967:	603)	who	argued	 ‘these	 terms	are	 loaded	with	associations	
derived	 from	 their	 use	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 and	 any	 suggestion	 that	 the	 attitudes	 they	
describe	 exist,	 in	 the	 same	 form,	 today	 is	 misleading’.	 Wedderburn	 (1967b:	 643)	 herself	
rebutted	 Marhsall’s	 view,	 arguing	 ‘I	 would	 not	 be	 so	 naïve	 […]	 as	 to	 suppose	 that	 these	






the	 answer	 options	 offered	 (Smith,	 1987,	 76).	 	 In	 presenting	 a	 fourfold	 argument	 for	 there	
being	greater	continuities	in	public	attitudes	than	is	typically	recognised	we	concede	that	our	
evidence	 is	strongest	when	pointing	to	earlier	examples	of	anti-welfare	state	sentiment	and	
qualified	 support	 for	 social	 security	 and	 social	 services.	 	 There	 is	 also	 we	 believe	 robust	
evidence	 pointing	 towards	 continuities	 in	 attitudes	 about	 there	 being	 groups	 that	 are	
variously	deserving	and	undeserving.		When	seeking	to	establish	that	contemporary	targets	of	
pejorative	 attitudes	 are	 not	 new	 targets	 of	 disapprobation	 we	 face	 greater	 difficulties.		
Although	 historical	 public	 attitudes	 regularly	 identified	 family	 allowances	 as	 an	 area	many	
people	wanted	to	cut,	we	do	not	know	whether	this	was	about	concerns	of	 large	families	or	
that	 support	 should	 only	 be	 retained	 for	 those	 seen	 as	 having	 particular	 moral	 or	 work	
characteristics;	while	there	are	echoes	of	contemporary	‘benefits	broods’	debates	(see	Jensen	
and	Tyler,	2015),	we	 cannot	 say	with	 certainty	how	deep	 the	 continuities	 are	based	on	 the	
historical	 survey	 data	 that	 is	 available.	 We	 also	 concede	 that	 there	 are	 subtle	 processes	
related	 to	 the	 crafting	 of	welfare	 commonsense	 that	make	 the	 interpretation	 of	 definitions	
and	 data,	 relating	 for	 example	 to	 disabled	 people,	 particularly	 problematic.	 Similarly,	 the	
evidence	 of	 ‘othering’	 by	 the	 ‘othered’	 is	 limited	 by	 our	 inability	 to	 probe	 below	 headline	











even	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 UK’s	 political	 left,	 once	 scornful	 of	 a	 perspective	




In	 particular,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 presumption	 that	 a	 more	 positive	 view	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	
existed	in	the	post-war	consensus	era.	Questioning	how	far	attitudes	to	welfare	differed	in	the	
past	 is	 not,	 therefore,	 merely	 an	 historical	 exercise;	 it	 matters	 for	 contemporary	





long	 co-existed	 alongside	 widely	 held	 positive	 attitudes	 to	 welfare,	 including	 during	 the	
‘golden	age	of	 the	welfare	 state’.	 	A	 strong	hierarchy	of	preferences	around	social	 spending	
has	always	persisted	almost	throughout	the	period	being	examined.	Health	is	overwhelmingly	
the	most	 popular	 area,	with	 education	 and	 pensions	 also	 typically	 high	 in	 the	 list	 of	 social	
spending	priorities.	Support	 for	working	age	cash	benefits,	particularly	 for	 the	unemployed,	
tends	 to	 be	 lower	 than	 support	 for	 services.	 There	 does	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 moralistic	 tone	
reflected	 in	 much	 of	 the	 data.	 	 Surveys	 conducted	 in	 the	 1950s,	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 often	




in	 the	 late	1960s	and	1970s.	Rather	 than	a	 simple	 linear	decline	 in	 support	 for	 the	welfare	
state	 since	 the	 ‘golden	 age’,	 support	 may	 well	 have	 fluctuated	 over	 the	 decades	 since	 the	
1940s.	
None	 of	 this	 is	 to	 challenge	 the	 veracity	 of	 arguments	 about	 the	 often	 hostile	 nature	 of	
contemporary	 debates5.	 Instead,	 we	 argue	 that	 if,	 within	 the	 complex	 and	 at	 times	
contradictory	 bundle	 of	 attitudes	 that	 make	 up	 ‘public	 opinion’,	 widespread	 pejorative	
attitudes	 to	welfare	were	 present	 during	 the	 golden	 era	 of	welfare	 state	 expansion	 then	 it	
suggests	 that	 the	existence	of	similar	views	today	need	not	be	a	barrier	 to	expanding	social	
policy	provision	today.			
In	other	words,	 the	social	 solidarity	of	an	earlier	era	may	well	have	rested	on	 terrain	more	
hostile	 to	 the	 welfare	 state	 than	 we	 often	 imagine	 was	 the	 case	 from	 today’s	 perspective.	
There	is	a	danger	that,	in	the	absence	of	robust	time-series	data,	we	‘fill	 in’	the	missing	data	
from	 before	 the	 BSA	 using	 presumptions	 about	 public	 attitudes	 to	 welfare	 which	 reflect	 a	
stylised	periodisation	of	the	past	in	which	a	‘post-war	welfare	consensus’	gave	way	to	a	more	
hostile	agenda	at	some	point	in	the	late	1970s.	Even	if	such	a	periodisation	was	true,		it	seems	
likely	 that	 it	 at	 best	 captured	 the	 attitudes	 of	political	elites	 rather	 than	 those	 of	 the	wider	
public.	
For	 those	 advocating	 stronger	 social	 policy	 interventions,	 nostalgia	 for	 an	 era	 when	 the	
welfare	state	appeared	to	be	much	more	widely	supported	can	indeed	be	strong.	But	nostalgia	
for	an	 idealised	version	of	 the	past	risks	adding	 to	 feelings	 that	 today’s	 ‘machine	of	welfare	
commonsense’	presents	a	political	hurdle	that	cannot	be	overcome.	While,	as	Jensen	and	Tyler	
(2015)	 rightly	 note,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 critical	 of	 the	 current	 day	 ‘social	 imaginary’,	 we	
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the	 research	 as	 it	 developed.	 Valuable	 feedback	 was	 provided	 by	 participants	 at	 two	
workshops	in	London	in	October	2015	and	January	2016,	York	in	May	2016	and	at	the	2015	
Social	 Policy	 Association	 conference	 in	 Belfast,	 where	 early	 versions	 of	 the	 work	 were	
presented.	The	 three	anonymous	referees	of	 the	paper	also	provided	very	helpful	 feedback.	
















issues	provides	 some	additional	 support	 for	 the	bounce	 thesis.	A	 series	of	questions	on	 the	 causes	of	poverty	
asked	 respondents	whether	 poverty	was	 a	 consequence	 of	 lack	 of	 effort	 or	 circumstances	 (or	 both);	 in	 1964		
28%	said	lack	of	effort	compared	to	38%	saying	circumstances,	by	1968	the	balance	had	shifted	towards	more	
individualist	 	 explanations	 (35%	 lack	 of	 effort	 v	 30%	 circumstances)	 and	 similar	 figures	were	 found	 in	 1977	
(33%	v	30%),	but	by	1985	there	was	a	strong	swing	back	in	the	opposite	direction	with	just	21%	citing	lack	of	
effort	 compared	with	49%	citing	 circumstances.	A	 series	of	questions	on	 support	 for	 increased	NHS	 spending	









5	We	have	 focused	here	on	public	 attitudes	but	 related	and	wider	debates	 focus	on	how	a	hostile	media	are	a	
central	 part	 of	 ‘a	 technology	 of	 consent’	 fuelling	welfare	 reform	 agenda.	 Past	 debates	 on	 attitudes	 to	welfare	
often	 expressed	 concern	 about	 impact	 of	 the	 media	 on	 attitudes	 and	 there	 may	 well	 be	 more	 continuities	
between	the	past	and	present	here	too	than	is	often	acknowledged.	For	example,	Golding	and	Middleton	(1982)	
suggest	 a	 hostile	mass	media	 has	 existed	 since	 the	 1920s.	 Interestingly,	 the	 Labour	 Party’s	 submission	 to	 Sir	
Henry	 Fisher’s	 1971	 Committee	 of	 Enquiry	 into	 Abuse	 of	 Social	 Security	 Benefits	 said	 ‘It	 is	 unfortunately	 a	
widely	held	belief	that	abuse	of	social	security	benefits	takes	place	on	a	large	scale.	This	belief	is	reinforced	by	
some	sections	of	the	‘popular’	press,	which	make	much	of	any	incidents	of	abuse	and	uses	highly	emotive	words	
such	as	‘scroungers’	for	people	suspected	of	abuse.	A	good	example	of	this	type	of	reporting	can	be	found	in	The	
Daily	Mail	of	June	10th	 ,	1971.	Under	the	title	 ‘The	Hushed-Up	Scandals	of	Social	Security”	(sub-head	“How	you	
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are	Being	Robbed	by	the	Dodgers”)	the	article	gives	a	highly	coloured	and	subjective	picture	of	so-called	abuse.”	
(Labour	Party	Archive,	1971	RD	197:	p1)	.	
